The 30-Year Debate on a Multi-Billion-Dollar Threat: Tephritid Fruit Fly Establishment in California JAMES R. CAREY, NIKOLAS PAPADOPOULOS, AND RICHARD PLANT I t is virtually impossible to overstate the seriousness of the tephritid fruit fl y threat to the $25 billion California fruit and vegetable industry constituting over half of the overall $47 billion agriculture economy of the state. Consider these facts: a total of 17 diff erent species of fruit fl ies have been detected in California, several of which are detected every few years and one of which is detected every year (Papadopoulos et al. 2013 ). More than 350 California cities have experienced fruit fl y outbreaks, seven cities (e.g., Fresno, Bakersfi eld) of which are located in one of the world's most productive agricultural regions-the Central Valley. Because of the wide host ranges and diverse life histories of the tephritid species that have been detected in the state, collectively these species are capable of attacking nine of the top 20 commodities (e.g., strawberry, oranges) produced in the state; the presence of tephritids in the state has the potential to trigger quarantine measures by eight of the top 10 countries (e.g., China, Japan, Mexico) to which California exports fruit and vegetable products because they all have climates favorable to tephritid establishment; and tephritid presence poses a nationwide threat to agricultural production. Th is is not only because California is the number one producer in the United States of 37 commodity groups at risk to tephritid fruit fl y attack, but also because California tephritid populations would become sources of inoculum for other U.S. states, as well as for Mexico.
Th ere is no other region of the U.S. or, indeed, in the world, that has experienced anything remotely similar to the patterns and frequency of tropical fruit fl y outbreaks as observed in California. Th is is despite the fact that its Mediterranean climate is sub-optimal for many of the tropical tephritids, and that the propagule pressure the state experiences, as indicated by tephritid interceptions at ports of entry (Liebhold et al. 2006) , is similar to the number of interceptions at many airports in cities located in regions classifi ed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture as at-risk for tephritid establishment (USDA 2006) . Th ese include Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Florida, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona, all of which have USDA-funded tephritid monitoring programs. However, despite the propagule pressure across all fruit fl y-friendly regions of the U.S. and territories whose populations are collectively many times greater than that of California, there have been no tephritid outbreaks in the vast majority of these at-risk regions. Exceptions include Texas, which experiences regular Mexican fruit fl y, Anastrepha ludens (Loew), outbreaks at its Mexican border. Tephritids are also sporadically detected in Florida, including the Mediterranean fruit fl y, Ceratitis capitata (Wiedemann), and the oriental fruit fl y, Bactrocera dorsalis (Hendel). Despite having climates favorable to the establishment of most tephritid species and having few if any regulatory impediments to fruit fl y introduction, Egypt and Israel are the only countries bordering the Mediterranean Basin (i.e., southern Europe and northern Africa) that have experienced any new fruit fl y invasions with a single species, Bactrocera zonata (Saunders), becoming established in Egypt in the late 1990s (White 2003) and now threatening to become established in Israel. Th ere have been no medfl y detections or outbreaks on the entire Asian continent or sub-continent, even though none of the countries in these regions have regulatory restrictions on commodity imports or at ports of entry even remotely as strict as those for California in particular and for the U.S. in general.
The bottom line is this: nowhere in the world are tephritid outbreaks as diverse (17 species), as frequent (yearly), as incessant (60+ years), as recurrent (≈700 repeats), and as widespread (≈350 cities) as are those in California. It follows that understanding the underlying nature of these frequent and widespread outbreaks regarding the establishment status of the invasive species is not only of utmost importance nationally, but of major importance internationally as well. Given what is at stake with the $25 billion dollar fruit and vegetable industry in California, it is imperative that monitoring and intervention policies be based on the results of objective analyses of detection data and interpreted in light of basic principles of invasion biology.
We are thus pleased that U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) entomologist Donald McInnis and 30 of his colleagues from a wide spectrum of agricultural institutions and agencies (hereafter referred to as the McInnis Group) were willing to present their arguments in their current paper (McInnis et al. 2017) or at an earlier international conference (McInnis et al. 2014 ) on why they believe our conclusions that three to fi ve tephritid fruit fl y species are established in California are wrong (Carey 1991 , 1996a , b, Papadopoulos et al. 2013 . We welcome this opportunity to respond and therefore to engage in a much-needed discussion on these important issues. Because of our high confi dence in the results of our study, the fl aws in the McInnis Group data and assertions, and the seriousness of the economic stakes (Paini et al. 2010) , we push back hard on their approach, their information sources, and their arguments. For example, we consider the premise of their paper a "straw man. " Th is is because they attempt to refute our argument of fruit fly establishment, while actually trying to refute an argument concerned with a question that we never asked: "Can fruit fly populations remain sub-detectable for sustained periods?" We address a number of what we consider to be equally serious flaws in the main sections of our paper.
We organize the paper into four main sections. First, we give a historical overview of the debate about the invasion status of tephritids in California starting in the late 1980s and continuing through the present. Second, we present rebuttals for 10 separate assertions or claims of the McInnis Group. Third, we examine the specific case of the invasion history of the oriental fruit fly in San Diego and contrast our data and approach with the approach by the McInnis Group concerning the underlying cause of their reappearances. Finally, we make recommendations for moving both science and policy forward. (Robert Dowell) that appearances of the Mediterranean fruit fly (medfly, Ceratitis capitata) in California were likely due to a low-level, established population rather than to reintroductions. He based his claims on two sets of facts: first, that the medfly outbreaks in the San Fernando Valley were repeats of outbreaks in many of the same cities eight to 10 years earlier (i.e., in or near the cities of Granada Hills, North Hollywood, Northridge, and Resida); second, that medfly outbreaks due to reintroductions would have been expected in at-risk (fruit-fly friendly) climatic regions of California and in the southern U.S. states with high propagule pressure (i.e., tephritid airport interceptions as proxies), but they had not occurred during this same period. Although his fellow panelists and both CDFA and U.S. Department of Agriculture senior administrators agreed that these observations were correct, they disagreed with his conclusion. Many of their counter-arguments were laid out and circulated among panel members and administrators in a draft document prepared by Chairman Cunningham titled "A Rebuttal of the Carey Hypothesis. "
Going Public. Carey's claims of medfly establishment became public in 1990, when he presented his assessment to the California Legislature's Committee of the Whole (Barinaga 1990 ). This testimonial was followed with scientific publications containing the detection data and outlining his hypothesis and logic. Papers included his original article on medfly establishment (Carey 1991) and a letter to the editor in response (Carey 1992) to others' challenges to his conclusions that were co-published (Saul 1992 , Voss 1992 . The paper by Roy Cunningham, the chair of the CDFA medfly science advisory panel in the mid-1990s, "which outlined many of the same arguments we [the McInnis Group] have stated in this paper two decades later" (see Acknowledgements in McInnis et al. 2017 ) was rejected for publication as a letter to the editor and, to our knowledge, was never re-submitted to another journal for peer-reviewed publication. Five years later, Carey published two papers concerned with medfly spread in the state (Carey 1996a, b) . Nearly a decade and a half after these papers appeared, Carey published another rebuttal (Carey 2010 , Chen 2010 , Liebhold et al. 2010 ) in response to the paper by Liebhold and his colleagues (Liebhold et al. 2006 ) in which they claimed that the medfly reappearances in California could be explained by periodic reintroductions (see Carey 2010) .
Broadening the Scope: Multiple Species Established. The specific debate about medfly establishment in California was subsumed in our relatively recent paper (Papadopoulos et al. 2013) . Based on detailed analysis of nearly 100% of the historical capture data on tephritids in California, we reaffirmed Carey's earlier conclusions that not only is the medfly established in the state, but several other species are also likely established. These included the oriental fruit fly, Bactrocera dorsalis, the guava fruit fly, Bactrocera correcta (Bezzi), the peach fruit fly, B. zonata, and the Mexican fruit fly, Anastrepha ludens. These conclusions were also based largely on the same sets of facts that Carey used previously, but with 25 years of additional outbreak data (i.e., repeat outbreaks in the same cities and/or regions and the absence of outbreaks in other at-risk regions of the U.S. and abroad).
Recent Challenges to Findings of Fruit Fly Establishment in California. This recent article elicited a response from A. P. Gutierrez and his colleagues, who argued that medflies could not survive in California due to climatic constraints (Gutierrez et al. 2014 ) and, therefore, could not be permanently established. (For point-by-point rebuttals, see Carey et al. 2014 ). The Papadopoulos et al. article (Papadopoulos et al. 2013 ) also elicited a response, titled "Can Polyphagous Invasive Tephritid Pest Populations Escape Detection for Years Under Favorable Climatic and Host Conditions?", which was delivered by entomologists in a keynote speech at the 9th International Symposium on Fruit Flies of Economic Importance, held in May 2014 in Bangkok, Thailand. With its 30+ authors affiliated with institutions or government agencies from over 20 countries, this presentation was less a talk and more a policy statement (McInnis et al. 2014) . Their abstract ended with a statement pointed directly at us: "Any scientist who concludes that tephritid eradication efforts may not always be successful is not only unscientific, but also irresponsible. "
We are dismayed that these 30+ signees, all professional entomologists, would have agreed to make such a disparaging statement: a set of assertions that ring hollow in light of the fact that none examined the California fruit fly capture data, much less published any findings from analyses of it. Accusations of "unscientific" and "irresponsible" impugn the integrity of not just ourselves, but of the reviewers and editors involved and of the journals in which our papers have appeared.
Cherry-Picking Data. In a 2015 letter to Stephen O. Duke, editor in chief of the journal Pest Management Science, James Carey and Richard Plant raised concerns that the claims of success rates for fruit fly eradication programs in California were distorted because the authors withheld data (i.e., data "cherry-picking") and failed to cite papers (e.g., Papadopoulos et al. 2013 ) whose conclusions differed from theirs. In response to the Carey and Plant letter, Duke asked that the authors submit an addendum to their article ) in order to acknowledge our paper and address the drastically differing conclusions (Papadopoulos et al. 2013 ). However, they stated incorrectly that they used the same data as the Papadopoulos team (we used an entirely different database), and claimed that "repeated similar [eradication] programs" were adequately represented in their database . Later in this paper, we address the issue of their data cherry-picking and the vast differences in the scope and depth of their data relative to ours.
Tephritid Invasions in California
Overview. Since 1954, when the first tropical tephritid fruit fly was detected in California, a total of 17 species in four genera and more than 11,000 individuals (adults/ larvae) have been detected in the state at nearly 3,500 locations in 334 cities (after Papadopoulos et al. 2013 , but data updated to 2016). We concluded that a minimum of five and as many as nine or more tephritid species are established and widespread, including the Mediterranean fruit fly, Ceratitis capitata, the Mexican fruit fly, Anastrepha ludens, the oriental fruit fly, Bactrocera dorsalis, and possibly the peach fruit fly, B. zonata, the guava fruit fly, B. correcta, and the melon fly, Bactrocera cucurbitae (Coquillett).
A summary of the history of detections of the two species most threatening to California, the medfly and the oriental fruit fly, is shown in Table 1 and Fig. 1 . Three invasion metrics in this table merit comment. The first is the length of time that each of these two species has been consistently detected in the state and their persistence (number of years detected), starting with their first capture to the present (e.g., over half a century for the oriental fruit fly and virtually every year). The second important metric is not only the large number of flies detected, but that over half of the detections are pre-adults (the vast majority are larvae). Clearly, in both species, there is concrete evidence of actively breeding populations. The third important metric in Table 1 is the number of cities that have experienced an outbreak of one or the other (or both) species.
Because of the prominence of these species in the state, their economic importance, and the fact that California mounted eradication campaigns against both of these species in 2016, we will describe in greater depth the history of these two invasive species in California. We start with the announcements posted on the California Department of Food and Agriculture's website: "Between November 14 and December 27, 2016, eighteen medflies were trapped in the communities of Arleta, North Hollywood, Panorama City, Sun Valley and the city of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County" and "Between September 29 and December 14, 2016, four male and one female oriental fruit flies (OFFs), Bactrocera dorsalis group, were trapped in the communities of San Pedro and Wilmington, Los Angeles County" (CDFA 2016) . The Mediterranean fruit fly, C. capitata, was first detected in 1975 in Santa Monica and several surrounding cities in Los Angeles County. This was followed by recurring outbreaks throughout the 1980s in both southern and northern California. The annual rates of medfly detections increased from three out of every five years between 1975 and 1989 to three out of every four years between 1990 and 2011. In the 36-year period between the first (1975) and last (2012) medfly detections, a total of 2,068 adults and 3,884 pre-adults (mostly larvae) were recovered on approximately 1,400 different properties in 170 California municipalities in 21 counties. This species has been detected repeatedly a total of 250 times in 47 different cities, including one city with medfly recaptures in 11 different years, two cities with recaptures in fi ve to six diff erent years, 12 cities with recaptures in three to four diff erent years, and 32 cities with recaptures in two diff erent years.
Rebuttals to Ten McInnis Group Claims
In this section, we rebut what we consider to be the most specious claims, assertions, and/or concepts in the paper by McInnis and his colleagues. Rebuttal 1: Regulatory databases do not contain scientifi c invasion data. Th e McInnis Group substitutes regulatory compliance information for hard detection data. Th e protocol used to set the criteria for eradication declaration for tephritids (i.e., three-generation absence of detections) are regulatory concepts concerned with legal requirements for commodity trade. Regulations require a binary system of classifi cation: for example, ppm thresholds in pesticide safety, number of days before fi eld re-entry after pesticide applications, and, in the case of tephritid eradication, chronological or physiological time without fruit fl y detections.
Regulatory policies are based on trade-off s between interested parties and according to the personal judgment of policymakers. Although regulations should be informed by science, they are virtually never based solely on science (Malakoff 2017 ) and do not themselves constitute science. Simply enumerating eradication declarations based on regulatory criteria, as do Suckling and his coauthors , Kean and his coauthors , and McInnis and his coauthors (McInnis et al. 2017 ), provides no reliable scientifi c information about true (biological) eradication success, only that region-and/or country-specifi c compliance conditions were met. Put another way, the arguments of Suckling et al. for eradication success are both circular and self-fulfi lling; their eradication criteria and eradication evaluations are identical (i.e., zero capture for three generations). 
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The length of fly-free periods across programs have no calculations for the probability of being wrong and are arbitrary (Meats and Clift 2005) . For example, the fly-free criteria for oriental fruit fly eradication programs in the Mariana island, Amani island (Japan), Okinawa island (Japan), and Mauritius were 18, 27, 52, and 104 weeks, respectively (see Table 1 , p. 1336 in Meats and Clift 2005) . It defies logic to accept uncritically (as the McInnis Group does) declarations of eradication successes contained in the GERDA database for programs that use fly-free periods for which there is neither scientifically nor regulatorily agreed upon duration that applies to all species and with no specification of details such as confidence limits, trap densities, or adjustments for seasonality and location.
Rebuttal 2: Immediate explosive tephritid population growth is science fiction. The claim by McInnis and his colleagues that tephritid fruit fly populations (or populations of any species) explode shortly after they are introduced is a scientific fiction that is used, not in biology, but in introductory mathematics classes to illustrate the power of exponential growth, i.e., "the pair of flies in one season will become the progenitors of a possible 121 quintillion flies, enough to cover the entire surface of the earth several feet deep" (Gillan 1912 ). The concept is completely ungrounded in principles of ecology, population biology, and invasion sciences (Simberloff and Rejmanek 2011) , inasmuch as the vast majority of invading species must progress through a series of phases (Davis 2011 , Rejmanek 2011 , including introduction, establishment, adaptation, and spread. Although the first phase (introduction) may be relatively short, all of the other phases require fairly lengthy periods of time. In particular, the duration of the adaptation phase requires multiple generations extending over at least several years and may take decades and even centuries to complete. These longer periods are considered invasion lags (Crooks and Soule 1999 , Sakai et al. 2001 , Crooks 2011 , causing slow-motion biological invasions (Crooks 2005) . As Sakai and her co-authors state, "One common feature of invasions is a lag time between colonization and the onset of rapid population growth and range expansion" (Sakai et al. 2001) .
To accept the argument by McInnis et al. of immediate explosive growth of tephritids each year for nearly 50 years in a row, including cities often separated by hundreds of kilometers, would be to accept a number of wildly unrealistic assumptions. Indeed, we would have to assume that, despite their tropical origins as well as experimental evidence that seven to 10 generations are required for adaptation to new environments (Soemori and Nakamori 1981, Leppla 1989) , all introduced tropical tephritids are pre-adapted to California's (Mediterranean) climatic conditions, they immediately begin reproducing at their maximum theoretical growth rates, and that they spread to 12 to 15 cities, many of which are hundreds of kilometers apart, at this maximal rate within one year. To accept the McInnis et al. claims would be to accept the argument that tephritids are not subject to the most basic principles of invasion science.
Rebuttal 3: "Can tephritids escape detection?" is not falsifiable. The question that the McInnis Group asks in their title is, strictly speaking, an illegitimate scientific question because as a hypothesis, it can never be tested directly and therefore can never be falsified. By basing their argument on the fictitious assumption of explosive population growth, they have built a fallacious answer into their question: i.e., that flies are always detectable over nearly any time frame. Thus, by framing their paper around this question, the answer of which is based on explosive growth, the McInnis Group not only revealed the answer they want a priori (i.e., a conclusion in search of evidence), they also avoided the most important initial question: "Is there evidence in the detection data that shows fruit flies escaping detection for sustained periods?" They remain willfully ignorant of the answer to this most basic question because they have never invested the time and effort required to analyze any of the historical detection data of tephritids in California.
If and when they do analyze these data, they will be hard pressed to explain historical detection patterns in ways other than by the existence of sub-detectable population levels for periods ranging from a few years to several decades. We illustrate this later in this paper using a database containing 45 years of detection information for the oriental fruit fly in San Diego. Rebuttal 4: Trap sensitivity claims have no basis in reality. The claim by the McInnis Group regarding the virtual certainty of fruit fly detectability is not credible because one of their assumptions is based on the fiction (described above) of immediate explosive population growth for each new tephritid introduction. Detectability estimates based on the results of release-recapture studies using tens of thousands of factory-reared laboratory strains of oriental fruit flies have little relevance to the detectability of wild flies living in their natural habitats. It is impossible for us to take seriously their fantastical claims of near-certain fruit fly detections (i.e., 99.9% certainty) within one generation based on simplistic math, naïve assumptions, and evidence-free, unrealistic assertions. We agree with the statement by Regan and his co-authors: "The notion of being sure that you have completely eradicated an invasive species is fanciful because of imperfect detection" (Regan et al. 2006 ).
Rebuttal 5: Genetic analysis implies multi-sourced established populations. McInnis and his colleagues incorrectly stated that "the established population hypothesis does not explain observed genetic diversity in California. " Combined with other evidence, including repeat finds in the same region and absence of outbreaks in most other at-risk regions, this genetic evidence suggests that with some invasive species (e.g., medfly), introductions from different world regions occurred either simultaneously (same year) or sequentially (different years) (Roderick 1996 , Davies et al. 1999 , Bohonak et al. 2001 . Presence of several haplotypes indicates multiple sources and invasions, but in no way supports the hypothesis that fruit flies are not established. It simply provides evidence of multiple invasions, some of which may be transient and others of which are permanently established. The fly detection database supports this hypothesis because it shows patterns that cannot be explained away by invoking the reintroduction theory (see section on oriental fruit fly in San Diego).
Rebuttal 6: "You can't prove a negative" is pseudologic. There are two problems with the statement by the McInnis Group that "Proving the absence of such established populations…is impossible, as it would be proving a negative. " First, as scientists themselves, members of the McInnis Group presumably know that scientists do not apply the concept of "proof" in discussing the results of their research. Rather, scientists consider greater or lesser degrees of confidence in hypothesis-testing. Second, "you can't prove a negative" is considered a form of folk logic or pseudo-logic (Damer 2009 ). There are many examples of proving a negative ranging from mathematics (e.g., there is no largest prime number) to law (e.g., proving non-receipt of a certain correspondence using a preponderance of the evidence). Just as legal experts consider degrees of "proof" such as "reasonable suspicion, " "substantial evidence, " and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt, " scientists consider gradations of confidence in their results. But neither legal experts nor scientists ever use the impossible standard of "proof (or support) beyond a shadow of a doubt. " Support of our claims is not and cannot be based on "proof, " but rather on the preponderance of evidence resulting from analysis of detection data and complemented by the results of genetic studies (Davies et al. 1999 , Bonizzoni et al. 2001 , Meixner et al. 2002 , Malacrida et al. 2007 ).
Rebuttal 7: Absence of eradication validation in other countries. Not only do the entries on eradication declarations in the database the McInnis Group references (GERDA) contain no useful information on the invasion status and/or the invasion dynamics of any species of invasive fruit fly in California, but the database also lacks entries on the vast majority of outbreaks. Additionally, the entry describing the details of the 1974-75 oriental fruit fly eradication program in San Diego, California (an outbreak on which we have all of the detection data) either contains a serious error or is incomplete. The error is this: the GERDA entry for this program states that eradication was confirmed in May 1975. However, our database reveals that oriental fruit flies continued to be detected in the outbreak regions throughout 1975. Because of the combination of cherry-picked data, minimalist information contained in the regulatory database (e.g., eradication outcome; cost), and incomplete information regarding the eradication status of the oriental fruit fly in California, we have no confidence in the veracity of the claims made by the McInnis Group concerning status of fruit fly populations in other countries. Indeed, it is clear to us that the McInnis Group made no effort to verify the claims by the CDFA of eradication successes. To gain such confidence, we would have to have full access to the detailed detection data over several decades or review an analysis by the McInnis Group using a comprehensive database with individual fly capture data.
The McInnis Group claims that the results of their study of medfly and Queensland fruit fly, Bactrocera tryoni (Froggatt), incursions in South Australia over a 29-year period (1970-1999) by Maelzer and his colleagues (Maelzer et al. 2004 ) supported the hypothesis that these pest fruit flies were being introduced annually to the region in and around Adelaide but "Most of the outbreaks died out within weeks of detection" (Jessup et al. 2007) . They not only failed to note that during this period, Adelaide and the surrounding area experienced 29 straight years of Queensland fruit fly outbreaks and medfly outbreaks in 21 out of 29 years (see Table 1 in Maelzer et al. 2004 ), but they also failed to note that Adelaide has experienced medfly outbreaks throughout the period subsequent to 2004, including the initiation of eradication programs in 2016 in the Adelaide suburbs of Colonel Light Gardens, Highgate, and Clarence Park (https://tinyurl.com/mz54krv).
Rebuttal 8: Bogus evidentiary demands. The assertion by McInnis and his colleagues that "there is no evidence to support such claims [of establishment by Papadopolous, Plant, and Carey]" is like a physician, having never looked at the diagnostic charts, demanding that early-stage cancer patients demonstrate that they have full-blown metastatic cancer to "prove" that they have a malignancy. Just as there are irrefutable diagnostics for early-stage cancers, there are incontrovertible signs of fruit fly establishment in incipient stages of invasion that are obvious to persons willing to analyze the detection data and objectively interpret the results. Despite having full access to the locations (latitude/longitude) of 11,000 individual tephritid detections in the state over the past 60+ years, members of the McInnis Group chose to remain willfully ignorant of these data. There is unequivocal evidence for the existence of sub-detectable populations of tephritids contained in these data, as we documented in our recent paper (Papadopoulos et al. 2013) , if only the McInnis Group would take the time to conduct an objective analysis of these data.
Rebuttal 9: Institutional solidarity is not scientific consensus. McInnis and his colleagues claim that "reinterpretation of…detection data [by Papadopolous et al., 2013] is at odds with the conclusions of most of the international tephritid fruit fly research community, " citing the 41 agency entomologists from 20 different countries associated with his paper (i.e., 12 authors + 29 colleagues cited in Acknowledgments). In the Addendum to their updated paper, Suckling and his colleagues ) stated "To date three teams with 45 authors…have opposed the interpretation by Papadopoulos et al. (2013) including a 30+ author presentation at an international symposium on fruit flies" (McInnis et al. 2014) . They cite the commentary by Gutierrez and his colleagues (Gutierrez et al. 2014 ) as a source of support for their position. However, in doing so, they either ignored or overlooked the inconvenient fact that, whereas Gutierrez et al. argue that California's climate is inhospitable to the medfly, McInnis and his colleagues argue that California's climate is super-optimal, inasmuch as these tephritids can begin breeding at maximal capacity immediately on introduction. Moreover, McInnis et al. purposely did not cite our rebuttal article immediately following the Gutierrez et al. commentary , in which we easily dismissed all of their claims, including the nonsensical one that the Mediterranean fruit fly could not survive in California-a state whose climate is primarily "Mediterranean" (Carey et al. 2014) .
Neither McInnis and his co-authors nor any of the other individuals, groups, or papers they cite have ever analyzed and published the actual historical detection data. Simply enumerating eradication declarations by government entomologists based on absence of trap capture is not an analysis of detection data. McInnis and his colleagues substitute the solidarity of scores of (mostly) agency entomologists opposed to our results for consensus of actual scientific findings (i.e., the fallacy that because many people claim it to be true, it must be true). According to Kahan and his colleagues (Kahan et al. 2012) , people often conform based on a desire for security within a group and thus try to reduce the risk of professional rejection. In the current professional environment, we believe that an agency entomologist who expresses support for tephritid establishment will likely be shunned by other agency entomologists and thus must conform or risk professional estrangement from his/her entomological community.
Rebuttal 10: The statement "interpretation of the same data" is false. We take strong, unmitigated exception to the patently false and misleading statement by Suckling and his colleagues (See Addendum, Suckling et al. 2016 ) that their database was the same as ours, as contained in their statement, "This interpretation of the same data for California is at odds with officially comprised committees. " Nothing could be farther from the truth than that they used "the same data" as we did (see Fig. 2 ). Suckling and his co-authors used regulatory data in GERDA consisting of around a dozen fields populated by the logistical and descriptive details on each of only 19 outbreaks in California for the past decade (except the 1974-75 San Diego outbreak). These fields included outbreak area and program start/end dates, cost, tools used, and outcome (i.e., eradication confirmed). In stark contrast, our database consisted of sex-specific data (latitude/longitude) for 11,000 detections and 17 different tephritid species, captured over a 63-year period and covering ≈350 cities. The vast differences in the details of the two databases are described in the next section.
The Scientific Dearth of the McInnis Group Database
Based on the absence of any reference to fly detection data in the form of reports or published papers, we infer that no member of the McInnis Group has taken the time to analyze the information in the California tephritid detection database, including capture date and location for each of ≈11,000 fly detections across 17 fruit fly species in ≈350 California cities spanning a 63-year period . Only one entry contains information on a program prior to this: a major oriental fruit fly outbreak that occurred in 1974-75 in San Diego (Fig. 2) . This number of entries is in stark contrast to the 535 times different California cities experienced fruit fly outbreaks in the 61-year period between 1954 and 2015 that were used in the analysis by Papadopoulos and his colleagues (Papadopoulos et al. 2013 ). Suckling and his co-workers attempted to justify this cherry-picking strategy with the spurious statement that the "GERDA [database] does not contain details of every eradication program…we consider repeated programs on the same species…are adequately represented…and that valid conclusions such as ours can be made" (see Addendum in Suckling et al. 2016) . Thus, the McInnis Group arguments were informed using only a tiny subset of eradication programs and only using data such as area, cost, lures, poisons, and duration. In contrast, Papadopoulos, Plant, and Carey used data on the individual locations (latitude/longitude) of ≈100% of the oriental fruit flies captured in the state by city and year. The differences in the databases are profound.
Minimalist information. An equally serious, if not greater, problem with the McInnis Group approach is the minimalist information that is available to them for the 19 entries from GERDA . For example, the entry for the 1974-75 San Diego oriental fruit fly outbreak is completely devoid of any details on the fly captures, with minimalist information on only program dates (September 1974 -May 1975 , size (81,585 ha), cost ($2.235 million USD), tools (bait spray; male annihilation), and outcome (claim of confirmed eradication). This is the only entry for the oriental fruit fly detections in San Diego, even though there were multiple detections in the city and surrounding areas, including one detection before 1974 and 16 eradication programs after 1975.
The GERDA database upon which the McInnis Group relied contained a tiny fraction of the data available for California tephritid invasions. Our database reveals that from 1960 through 2012, there were over 4,000 oriental fruit flies (larvae and adults) detected in 244 different California cities at 1,500 different locations. In stark contrast, the GERDA database only contains records for single-year outbreaks in 19 different California cities. For example, between 1982 and 2007, there was a total of 129 eradication projects in California on oriental fruit fly alone. GERDA provides no information on the vast majority of these, nor on the historical capture patterns of this species for any of the 245 cities in which B. dorsalis was captured. Yet eradication was declared each year for all of these cities based on the three-generation day-degree model eradication criteria.
These authors presented only single-year data for each of these (and 14 other) cities, without any reference to detections before or after (for example, the 17 subsequent years the oriental fruit fly was discovered in San Diego or the 17 previous years this pest was discovered in Los Angeles). In their paper, Suckling and his colleagues ) accepted CDFA's claims of 100% success in 100% of cities in 100% of years, regardless of new detections that often occurred a few weeks after declaring eradication. Suckling et al. exclude the hundreds of instances where B. dorsalis and most other species were detected in the same city (often within blocks) either before or after the date contained in the database. For example, GERDA contains data on an outbreak in Los Angeles in 2006, which was then (according to their record) successfully eradicated. Critical data that were omitted include the 26 years B. dorsalis was detected in this same city other than 2006, including data leading up to the period just before (1976, 1979, 1980-85, 1989, 1991-98, 2001-02, 2004-05) and immediately after (2007, . Similarly, the GERDA database contains information for an oriental fruit fly outbreak in the Anaheim, Artesia, and Cerritos area in 2013, but omits the fact that this is precisely the region that this species was first detected in the state in 1960 and that previous captures also included 1966, 1977, 1980, 1983-84, 1986, 1993, 1998, 2004, and 2010-12. Scientific shortcomings. The refusal of the McInnis Group to examine the tephritid detection data results in an absence of details and an absence of analysis. In terms of the absence of details, the restriction of their data source to GERDA or GERDA-level minimalist information makes it impossible for the McInnis Group to describe any scientific details of the outbreaks. Indeed, the Global Eradication and Response Database (GERDA) report for the 1974-75 oriental fruit fly outbreak in San Diego includes only 12 data items, including taxon (B. dorsalis), location (San Diego), detection date (6 September 1974), infestation size (81,585 ha), management decision (attempt eradication), program start (September 1974 ), program end (May, 1975 , cost ($2.235 million), outcome (eradication confirmed), lure (male annihilation), quarantine movement (yes), and pesticide (protein bait spraying).
In terms of the absence of analysis, by ignoring the entire treasure-trove of detailed data on individual fly detections, it is impossible for the McGinnis group to conduct any type of analysis on the 1974-75 San Diego oriental fruit fly outbreak. They accept without question the declared outcome of the outbreak (i.e., "eradication confirmed"). In contrast, we draw on the fly capture data in San Diego from the first detection in the city in 1971 through the most recent detection in 2015 to consider the 1974-1975 outbreak in broader historical context. Therefore, we were able to answer a range of important questions on the likelihood of establishment in particular and on the efficacy of programmatic protocols more generally.
Oriental Fruit Fly in San Diego: Overwhelming Evidence of Establishment
Conceptual and Definitional Issues
Eradication: definitional issues. The regulatory criteria for declaring eradication accepted by trading partners as well as by regulatory entomologists worldwide is the one specified by the International Phytosanitary Commission: the absence of detection after three generations (FAO 2016) . This is not a scientific concept, but a regulatory one that applies to all tephritid species regardless of their detectability (through attractants, traps, and host-cutting), their seasonality (although see Meats and Clift 2005) , and/ or their previous history of detection either locally or regionally. The concept is not based on numerical analysis of any detection data (e.g., latitude/longitude of fly captures) either in the year(s) of capture or in the previous years; nor is the declaration of eradication revisited if new detections arise in the eradication zone a few days after the three-generation no-detection criteria is met. In this case, eradication is declared and a new eradication program launched against a putative new infestation.
Our definition of eradication and our criteria for its declaration are fundamentally different than the criteria for declaring eradication outlined by IPC and the McInnis Group. Like disease epidemiologists, we consider eradication as a scientific absolute. We paraphrase Stepan's (2011) definition for disease reduction to apply to fruit flies: eradication is the reduction of a tephritid population to zero as a result of an intervention program by state and federal agencies. We distinguish eradication from "control," which refers to the reduction of tephritid populations to low (sub-detectable) levels to meet regulatory trade criteria of eradication (Myers et al. 2000) . Our emphasis is on the presence of zero individuals in a population to prevent recurrence and not simply on inability to detect individuals as an eradication proxy. Our definition requires systematic, detailed, and long-term spatiotemporal analysis of the nearly 3,500 fly detections over the past 65 years. We do not accept regulatory criteria as prima facie evidence of eradication as defined in both Stepan (2011) and Myers et al (2000) .
Data sources: scientific versus operational information. There are two basic categories of data used in assessment: programmatic data and detection data. Programmatic data include basic operational, logistical, and technical information on eradication programs such as outbreak location (city), program start-stop dates, infestation size and eradication costs, trapping details (lure or trap), tools used (pesticides, SIT), and whether the compliance threshold of no capture in three generations was met and thus eradication declared. Databases of programmatic By contrast, databases of detection data contain the raw scientifi c information on the invasion itself and thus serve as the basis for scientifi c analysis. Th is information includes the sex-and stage-specifi c number of fl ies, their precise location (including property address and/ or latitude/longitude), host tree, trap and lure type, and complementary details entered by the trapper.
Issues concerning the scientifi c bases for regulatory guidelines. We are unaware of any empirical or theoretical scientifi c studies that inform the regulatory guidelines used by CDFA and the USDA, most of which are outlined in the International Plant Protection Convention ISPM 26 (ISPM 26 pp10-26 in FAO 2016) . Th e guidelines include considering the detection of a single adult as "unactionable," while considering "actionable" the detection of immatures, two or more fertile adults, or an inseminated female. Th is regulatory guideline is logical on face value; if fruit fl ies are detected, it is virtually certain that they arose from a breeding population. Th e guidelines defi ne a quarantine zone as the area of a circle 17 km in diameter centered on the detection location. Th ere appears to be no evidence that this specifi es the extent to which any tephritid species has spread around a single detection. It is also not logical that this area would apply to every tephritid species, regardless of their life history. Finally, the regulations declare an area fruit fl y-free and thus "eradicated" after three generations of zero detections. Th ere appears to be no hard scientifi c evidence that validates this three-generation rule, and particularly none that suggests that the rule would apply to all species of tephritids under all circumstances.
Oriental Fruit Fly Detection Patterns
Statewide outbreaks. Th e oriental fruit fl y was fi rst detected in California in 1960 (Fig. 3) . By 1970, it began to spread, although still contained in the Los Angeles Basin and nearby areas. However, by 1980, there were multiple new outbreaks of the pest in this region as well as new outbreaks in and around San Diego on the border with Mexico. By 1990, the fl y was found in the Bay Area and Sacramento; by 2000, it was detected in the Central Valley city of Bakersfi eld; and by 2010, new outbreaks were occurring in all infested regions from south to north as well as the interior Central Valley.
San Diego outbreaks: 45 years and counting. In 1971, one oriental fruit fl y adult was captured in a neighborhood of San Diego (Pacifi c Beach), a detection that represented the fi rst time in the history of either the city or the county that this pest was detected (Fig. 4) . Th is capture was followed three years later by the largest outbreak of this tephritid in the history of the state at that time, in which nearly 700 adults and 400 larvae were discovered at over 20 diff erent locations in two primary outbreak clusters 10 to 12 km apart. One of the main outbreak clusters was ing 1976, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006 1974-75 1976-2015 1971 10 km 10 km 1976, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2015 (Table S8 in Papadopoulos et al. 2013) . In other words, there was a new oriental fruit fly outbreak on an average of every 1.7 years. All of this information is absent from GERDA, the go-to database for the McInnis Group. As a preliminary analysis of spatial infestation data on the oriental fruit fly in San Diego and surrounding areas, we used a spreadsheet to compute distance (latitude/longitude) between all combinations of detections in 1974-75 (n=204) relative to detections in subsequent years (n=127). This examination revealed that one fly was detected within 50 m of another fly captured in 1974 (i.e., within 1/2 block) and three others were within 100 m of other flies captured in 1974 (i.e., within one block). Sixty other flies captured subsequent to 1974-75 were within 500 m. Nearly three fourths of the 1974-75 detections were within 1,000 m of one or more subsequent detections, and 100% were within 3,000 m. In San Diego there were subsequent detections within 1,000 m of 1974 finds, including two out of two, seven out of nine, and and three out of four flies in 1983, 1986-87, and 1995-96 We estimated the sizes of infestations in 1974-75 and all subsequent detections combined to by drawing ovals around the collection of all detections and estimating their areas as approximately 1,750 km 2 and 5,750 km 2 for the 1974-75 and all subsequent outbreaks, respectively. Thus, the infested area increased by over three-fold relative to the 1974-75 infestation.
45-year History of Oriental Fruit Fly Detections in San Diego
Failure of the McInnis Group Reintroduction Hypothesis
Any argument by the McInnis Group that all 24 outbreak years over a 45-year period are due to re-introductions of the oriental fruit fly must be reconciled with four sets of facts:
(1) There was no detection of the oriental fruit fly in San Diego for 150 years prior to 1971 followed by the huge outbreaks in and around this city in 1974 and 1975. San Diego has been a hub of commercial and tourism activity since the turn of the 20th century and a major naval port during World War II. It is illogical that in the 1970s, oriental fruit flies would suddenly begin being introduced every few years, after no flies were detected for the previous ≈100+ years.
(2) Pest detections are absent in nearly all other regions of the United States that are designated by the USDA as fruit fly-friendly and that experience high propagule pressure as indicated by interceptions at ports of entry. Although a small number of oriental fruit flies have now also been detected in a handful of cities in Florida, these detections did not begin until 1999, which was nearly 40 years after the fly was first detected in California in 1960. It makes no sense that San Diego would be vulnerable year-in and year-out, while at the same time, other highrisk regions with tephritid propagule pressure (Liebhold et al. 2006 ) would remain immune.
(3) There have been repeat appearances of the fly in exactly the same area and many times within a few hundred meters of where they had been detected years and decades before.
(4) The historically progressive spatial patterns of outbreaks are indistinguishable from the patterns that would be expected of an invasive insect spreading naturally over a 45-year period (i.e., eastward and northward).
Recommendations
As stated by Schaal (2017) in her recent editorial on the subject of informing policy with science, "For policies to be successful, we must first understand the current state of knowledge so that policymakers can design policy interventions that will be effective." Interpreted in the context of fruit fly threats to agriculture, it follows from this statement that both tactical protocols and strategic policies concerned with tephritids in California and elsewhere may not only need to be re-visited, but to be reconceived. In this spirit, we offer the following recommendations for consideration.
Scientific versus policy questions. The first important recommendation is that federal agencies need to explicitly differentiate between questions that involve scientific judgement and questions that involve judgment about economics, ethics, and other matters of policy (Science for Policy Project 2009).
Ongoing analyses of detection data. Action and/or eradication projects should be based on a new suit of modelling taking into consideration historical detection data, the genetic and spatial affinity of the detected individuals, and the landscape resistance (friction). These kinds of models have been developed and are recently considered in eradication efforts of the tsetse flies in Africa (Bouyer et al. 2015) .
Dynamics of ultra-small populations. A new set of empirical approaches focusing on small, isolated, and "under-the-radar" populations needs to be developed. Rather than inferring the detection efficacy of the currently deployed trapping grids from release-recapture studies, alternative approaches need to be developed to consider the biology of wild populations and spatial fidelity.
Invasion biology of tephritids. An institutional, longterm approach based on principles of invasion biology and bringing together all involved disciplines (including fruit fly biology and ecology, stress physiology, spatial statistics, climatic modelling, and economics) should be followed to deal with fruit fly invasion in California. Such an initiative has been established in Australia to address fruit flies in a thorough and comprehensive manner (Centre for Fruit Fly Biosecurity Innovation: http:// www.fruitflyittc.edu.au/.
Invasion genetics. All detected individuals should be subjected to genetic analysis, and data should be freely available to scientific community for detailed analysis and evaluation. Reconstruction of invasion routes facilitates the design of strategies for preventing invasion, helps design specific monitoring and quarantine measures targeting the source area, facilitates the design of control measures (e.g., biocontrol agents); and provides a basis for formulating and testing different hypotheses concerning factors underlying biological invasions Guillemaud 2010, Lombaert et al. 2011) .
Operational protocols. By their nature and in order to adapt to the times, regulations across all government domains need to be revisited and updated periodically. The regulations applying to fruit fly management and intervention are no exception. Monitoring programs, criteria for launching eradication programs, the area to be placed under quarantine, and the time required for declaring eradication success all need to be revisited. In particular need of review is the concept of the "one-sizefits-all-tephritids" approach.
Australian model. Realizing the huge importance of the fruit fly problem, Australia has established a five-year, $45 million (USD) program to address all aspects of fruit fly biology and launch a sound, efficient, and sustainable management of the Queensland fruit fly. The spread of major fruit fly pests into previously "fruit fly pest-free" areas, increased international concerns, regulation to prevent fruit fly invasion, and regulatory banning of effective insecticides are holistically addressed by the Center for Fruit Fly Biosecurity Innovation, a program involving a combination of basic and applied research with engagement of policy and regulatory entomologists, politicians, growers, and both agency and academic scientists (CSIRO 2017).
Concluding Remarks
A question often asked of us, but one that also needs to be asked of the McInnis Group, is "Why does it matter whether one or more tephritid species is established in California if the response to outbreaks is the same, regardless of their invasion status?" Our reply is that, aside from the much-needed updating of intervention protocols (as we outlined earlier), it matters less for short-term planning as outbreak "first responders. " But therein lies the problem: short-term thinking. Developing a long-term strategy for dealing with the tephritid outbreaks cannot consist simply of plans for repeatedly extinguishing local "brush fires. " Rather, a long-term plan needs to be informed by an understanding of the true nature of a problem that is virtually certain never to go away. Questions regarding, for example, why the oriental fruit fly has been detected in California for each of the past 45 years (with no detections in nearly all other at-risk states) must be answered in order to develop a thoughtful, informed, and sustainable long-term strategy. Such a strategy would contain contingency plans for dealing with unexpected massive outbreaks and ever-increasing numbers of smaller outbreaks that morph into growing numbers of larger outbreaks, and that requires input from the public, growers, and government policy makers. That members of the McInnis Group, most of whom are regulatory entomologists, seem uninterested in engaging this question and related ones is as perplexing as it is disturbing.
Whatever one believes about the issue of establishment versus reintroduction of invasive tephritids in California, we all agree that these pests are appearing in frightening numbers, at disturbing frequencies, and over ever-expanding areas. The time has come for all sides-agency administrators, regulatory entomologists, agency scientists, academic researchers, and California growers-to work together to establish a robust, long-term, and sustainable plan for dealing with this never-ending threat, not only to California agriculture, but to fruit and vegetable growers throughout the at-risk U.S. states.
